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Abstract || Since the onset of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, literature has responded to the pandemic with works that 
testify to the devastating loss imposed on millions of people worldwide. After the implementation of effective 
antiretroviral treatment (ART) in the mid-90s, however, contemporary experiences of HIV might be expected to 
diverge their attention from grief and mourning to more “positive” emotions. The aim of this paper is to consider such 
a potential paradigm shift among new generations of HIV+ people with access to ART. To do so, it explores Danez 
Smith’s lyric approach to a 21st-century racialized experience of HIV, attempting to read it as constructive rather 
than destructive, without leaving intersectionality aside, in light of both Afropessimism and Queer Optimism. 
 
Keywords || Danez Smith | HIV/AIDS | Queer Optimism | Afropessimism | 21st-century Poetry 
 
«My Proof of Life»: el VIH como reificación de la metafísica negra en 
Homie de Danez Smith 
 
Resumen || Desde la aparición del VIH/SIDA en la década de 1980, la literatura ha respondido a la pandemia con 
trabajos que dan testimonio de la devastadora pérdida impuesta a millones de personas en todo el mundo. Sin 
embargo, después de la implementación de un tratamiento antirretroviral eficaz (TAR) a mediados de los años 
noventa, es de esperar que las experiencias contemporáneas del VIH desviaran su atención del dolor y el duelo 
hacia emociones más «positivas». El objetivo de este artículo es considerar este potencial cambio de paradigma 
entre las nuevas generaciones de personas VIH+ con acceso al TAR. Para ello explora el enfoque lírico que lleva 
a cabo Danez Smith de la experiencia racializada del VIH del siglo XXI, e intenta leer esta experiencia como 
constructiva en lugar de destructiva, sin dejar de lado la interseccionalidad y considerando en este contexto las 
perspectivas del afropesimismo y del optimismo queer. 
 
Palabras clave || Danez Smith | VIH/SIDA | Optimismo queer | Afropesimismo | Poesía del siglo XXI 
 
«My Proof of Life»: VIH com a reificació de la metafísica negra a Homie 
de Danez Smith 
 
Resum || Des de la seva aparició als anys huitanta, la literatura ha respost a la pandèmia de VIH/SIDA amb treballs 
que testimonien la devastadora pèrdua patida per milions de persones arreu del món. Després de la implementació 
de tractaments antiretrovirals efectius (TAR) a mitjans dels anys noranta, tanmateix, podria esperar-se que les 
experiències contemporànies de VIH canviaren la seva atenció des de l’afecció i el dol a emocions més «positives». 
L’objectiu d’aquest article és considerar el potencial canvi de paradigma entre les noves generacions de gent 
seropositiva amb accés a TAR. A tal efecte, l’article explora l’aproximació lírica que Danez Smith fa a l’experiència 
racialitzada de VIH al segle XXI, intentant llegir aquesta experiència com constructiva en lloc de destructiva, sense 
deixar de banda la interseccionalitat, i en el context de l’afropessimisme i de l’optimisme queer.  
 
Paraules clau || Danez Smith | VIH/SIDA | Optimisme queer | Afropessimisme | Poesia segle XXI 
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The eternally loading screen that is blackness 
waiting to be called other than absence of. 
 
Justin Phillip Reed 
 
 
0. Introduction: Poetry in the “Post-Crisis” Era 
 
2021. Forty years have passed since the slow but relentless outbreak of 
a pandemic that would mark contemporary history with its indelible 
imprint. On June 5, 1981, the US Center for Disease Control published 
an article describing five rare cases of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia 
in young, previously healthy, white men. This was the first official report 
of what would later come to be known as HIV/AIDS. Since then, over 
thirty-two million people have died from AIDS-related health 
complications, and to this day up to one million continue to die yearly due 
to lack of access to medication (UNAIDS, 2020). However, the advent of 
effective antiretrovirals in 1996—the “pharmaceutical threshold” (Pearl, 
2013)—has made it possible for many to lead healthy lives with HIV in 
the “post-crisis” period (Kagan, 2018). 
 
Among them is Forward-prize laureate Danez Smith, who self-describes 
as a “Black, Queer, Poz writer and performer” (Smith, n.d.)2. Smith’s early 
work is in direct dialogue with and pays heartfelt homage to the legacy of 
prominent voices in Black American literature: Audre Lorde’s poetic 
meditations on sexual empowerment, accounts of intersectionality avant 
la lettre and political struggle permeate Smith’s creative production, as 
do James Baldwin’s insightful explorations of the Black, queer body’s 
development in the religious contexts of Black Pentecostalism3. But it is 
to Essex Hemphill and Assotto Saint’s lyric testimony of living with HIV 
as queer, Black Americans in the 90s that Smith’s latest writing shows a 
most earnest debt4. 
 
Regrettably, the creative production by such late poets was both fueled 
and extinguished by the AIDS crisis; hence the crucial role played by loss 
in their writing5. Contrastingly, Smith’s work—as that of Jericho Brown’s 
or L. Lamar Wilson’s—stems from the contemporary “privilege” of having 
access to antiretroviral treatment. Nonetheless, the positive HIV 
diagnosis explored in Smith’s Don’t Call Us Dead (2017) does certainly 
trigger a profound investment in loss6, and critics have adequately read 
it as an example of “black pastoralism” (Haines, 2019) and of the “Black 
Lives Matter elegy” (Lennon, 2020; Austin et al., 2020). Moreover, in this 
collection the speaker juxtaposes HIV and the police brutality persisting 
in the 21st century as byproducts of the same systemic white supremacy. 
But reducing Smith’s account of HIV exclusively to loss would perpetuate 
a conceptual association which today should seem, at least, outdated. If 
it is true that poetry can find beauty amid the most heartrending of 
situations, Smith’s picture of HIV is no exception. 
 
After an almost devout dedication to loss in Don’t Call Us Dead, Smith’s 
following volume Homie (2020a) focuses on the healing constructiveness 
of friendship. HIV does occasionally feature in it, but when it is mentioned, 
the speaker does not approach it in exclusively “negative” terms. In “old 
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confession & new”, for instance, the speaker’s traumatic reaction to the 
positive diagnosis in the past is contrasted with their serene 
acknowledgement of it in the present: “now that it’s an old fact, can it be 
useful? / that which hasn’t killed you yet can pay the rent / if you play it 
right” (Smith, 2020a: 59). While HIV has not stopped being perceived as 
a potential threat which “hasn’t killed you yet”, there is a chance that the 
speaker might profit from their serostatus. Controversial as the reasons 
behind such shift may be, the lyric I’s understanding of their diagnosis 
has taken a considerable turn. HIV no longer evokes almost exclusive 
images of death and decay as it does in Don’t Call Us Dead; it no longer 
calls for protection and self-defensiveness only7. Instead, loss proves not 
to be incompatible with gain because, rather than ineluctable 
devastation, HIV can also be a promise of abeyant constructiveness. In 
a similar vein to “old confession & new,” “sometimes i wish i felt the side 
effects” shows acceptance for HIV, but most importantly this poem also 
claims it as a defining element of the self, and even professes love for it: 
 
[…] you learn to love it. yes. 
i love my sweet virus. it is my proof 
 
of life, my toxic angel, wasted utopia  
what makes my blood my blood. (Smith, 2020a: 33)  
 
But how to interpret such “love”? How does HIV become a “sweet virus”? 
Can HIV truly come to be perceived so positively that, as the title itself 
states, even its side effects are longed for? And what might the wish for 
side effects stated in the title be indicative of, if not a masochistic wish for 
a reification of stigma? Might the speaker’s life be so unbearable as to 
find solace in the prospect of a death from untreated HIV giving way to 
AIDS?  
 
Scholarly writing about HIV/AIDS literature has predominantly focused 
on the experience of loss, frequently recurring to the psychoanalytical 
paradigm of mourning and melancholia in its analysis8. Whereas this 
approach can be adequate for a literature so prominently featuring death, 
it is in slight conflict with those instances of HIV that—as Smith’s lines 
above show—no longer perceive the virus as exclusively threatening. 
Thus, to continue to universalize loss as the central event portrayed in 
HIV/AIDS literature would fail to include a much wider range of 
experiences, such as those of people who can now lead healthy lives 
with HIV. If the devastating impact of the pandemic must continue to be 
acknowledged and explored, it is also necessary to consider how in the 
21st century HIV may also offer other possibilities. 
 
In Queer Optimism, Michael Snediker shows regret that most analyses 
of queer literature associate queerness with negative affect: 
“[m]elancholy, self-shattering, shame, the death drive: these, within 
queer theory, are categories to conjure with” (Snediker, 2009: 4). Against 
this pessimistic tendency, which he finds “less than practicable (or 
survivable) in lived experience” (13), Snediker chooses to work through 
the lens of optimism. In his close-reading of poetry by Hart Crane, Emily 
Dickinson, Jack Spicer, or Sylvia Plath, Snediker insists on finding room 
for hope and constructiveness, refusing to allow these writers’ somber 
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fame to limit the reception of their work. The analysis of Smith’s verse 
that I propose here follows Snediker’s path. While my optimistic reading 
is interested in finding hope amid the wreckage of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, I do not wish to suggest that any of my interpretations actually 
correspond, in unambiguous or restrictive terms, to the poet’s stated 
intention when writing these texts. Mine is merely one of the many 
readings that Smith’s work makes possible, and my aim is to explore 
Smith’s verse in search of such possibilities. 
 
Increasingly removed from the devastating losses at the end of the 
century, can 21st-century poz youths come to perceive their status as 
other than loss? Must HIV continue to be lived as a traumatic, destructive 
element within the self, or could it somehow be lived as constructive? In 
what follows, I want to consider the possibility and implications of living 
with HIV as a potentially beneficial experience. With this in mind, I will be 
reading Smith’s “sometimes i wish i felt the side effects” (included in 
Homie) in dialogue with Queer Optimism as well as with the notion of 
social death recovered by Afropessimist thinkers. How may Queer 
Optimism illuminate, interact with or defy our understanding of HIV in the 
present? And how would this equation be affected by the racialization 
embodied in Smith’s verse? What would an intersectional reading of 




1. HIV’s Proof of Life 
 
Divided into three sections of eight couplets each, “sometimes i wish i felt 
the side effects” explores a wide range of emotional responses to being 
HIV positive. If “old confession & new” showcases the contrast between 
an initially fearful reaction to the diagnosis and its currently fruitful 
possibilities, “sometimes i wish i felt the side effects” takes the reader on 
a more detailed journey through the fluctuations of self-perception in 
relation to HIV. The poem starts with a wish for a tangible manifestation 
of the virus in the asymptomatic speaker’s body, an idea conveyed by 
both the title and the metaphor—already explored in Don’t Call Us 
Dead—of HIV as pregnancy9: “i wish i knew the nausea, its thick yell // in 
the morning, pregnant proof / that in you, life swells” (Smith, 2020a: 33). 
But maternal instinct suddenly turns to filicide: “i’m not a mother, but i 
know what it is / to nurse a thing you want to kill // & can’t” (2020a: 33). 
After this reference to the tragedy of Medea’s story, the speaker drifts 
from the aforementioned “love” for their “sweet virus” to responsibility: 
“knew what could happen. needed / no snake. grew the fruit myself” 
(2020a: 34); from regret: “i braved the stupidest ocean. a man. / i waded 
in his stupid waters” (2020a: 33); to relief: it felt like I got it / out the way, 
to finally know it up close” (2020a: 33). But the shifting tone of this piece 
settles on the acceptance and appreciation running up to the final image: 
 
i want to live. think i mean it. 
took the pill even on the days 
 
i thought i wouldn’t survive myself. 
gave my body a shot. love myself 
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at least that much. thank you, me. 
thank you, genvoya, my seafoam savior. 
 
thank you, sick blood, my first husband, bff 
dead river bright with salmon. (2020a: 34) 
 
While each of the speaker’s affective reactions to HIV deserves careful 
attention, the troubling thankfulness here shown offers most food for 
thought in relation to this paper’s endeavor. As these lines clarify, the 
speaker’s appreciation of HIV does not respond to anything like 
masochism or a “death drive”. Reading the poem as suicidal would bump 
up against the explicit appreciation for Genvoya, the tablets taken as 
antiretroviral treatment, and even more specifically against the 
willingness to live on expressed in these lines.  
 
As I am about to argue, the final couplet in this poem holds the key to the 
speaker’s reconciliation, thankfulness and love expressed for the virus. 
Yet, this metaphor of the speaker’s blood as a “dead river bright with 
salmon” offers two possible, antithetical interpretations. A first reading 
could attribute the causality of death to the threatening presence of HIV. 
The salmon would therefore symbolize dead T cells, their brightness here 
suggesting a devastation to the immune system. Static, floating fish—
their scales reflecting sunlight on the surface of the river. Death clogging 
the speaker’s veins, blood as a battlefield strewn with the casualties of 
massacred lymphocytes. From this perspective, the blood’s sickness and 
the river’s death are one and the same thing: the havoc wreaked by HIV’s 
siege to self-preservation. 
 
Against this idea, I prefer to suggest, controversially, that HIV is portrayed 
not as the causality of death but as a symbolic remedy to it. The final lines 
in the poem allow death to be perceived as a preexisting condition 
affecting the speaker before their HIV diagnosis. That is, in “sometimes i 
wish i felt the side effects”, the river—the speaker’s veins, their body—
can be seen as always already “dead”, yet this death is not caused by 
the “sick blood” inside it but in point of fact challenged by it. I am arguing 
that the blood is not “bright” with dead fish, but with thriving salmon 
sparkling as they swim upstream. The maritime imagery in the second 
section of the piece, where the speaker recounts how “i braved the 
stupidest ocean. a man. […] took his stupid // fish into my stupid hands 
and bit into it” (33-34), already represents HIV as fish taken into the I, 
adding to my interpretation. From this perspective, the salmon at the end 
of the poem appear not as a metaphor for dead T cells, or for the 
speaker’s immune system more generally, but as HIV itself. The closing 
image of salmon is thus not a synecdoche of the I as battling the virus 
but, rather, the virus within the I or, even further, the virus as enabling the 
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2. The Meta-Aporia of (Social) Death 
 
Before I continue my reading of this poem as representative of a life-
giving experience of HIV, I need to clarify how it is possible for the 
speaker to perceive themself as dead even before their diagnosis. As I 
have just claimed, the speaker’s blood—and, by extension, the speaker 
themself—can be understood as already dead. My suggestion does not 
respond to an idea of actual or physical death but to Orlando Patterson’s 
notion of social death. Although Patterson’s coinage refers to one of the 
main defining characteristics of slavery—alongside “natal alienation” and 
“dishonor” (Patterson, 1982)—, his spearheading contribution has been 
adopted by other contemporary thinkers as an accurate expression of the 
current social experience of Black Americans. In Patterson’s text, social 
death refers to the fact that, under slavery, an individual has “no social 
existence outside of his master” (1982: 38). An enslaved person is 
“alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth,” Patterson explains, so “he 
cease[s] to belong in his own right to any legitimate social order,” thus 
becoming “a social nonperson” (1982: 5). By this, Patterson does not 
mean that enslaved people are not human, or can have no social 
relations, but that they are not acknowledged as such by society at large 
and that their bonds have no social recognition nor legal support. 
However, as the work of other Black thinkers such as Judy (2020), 
Hartman (2008), Sexton (2011, 2015), Sharpe (2016), Warren (2015, 
2018), Wilderson (2016, 2020), and Wynter (1994) testifies, Patterson’s 
use of social death exclusively around active slavery limits its actual 
scope and representative potential. 
 
Drawing on Patterson’s concept, so-called Afropessimists propose that, 
at least for racialized people in the United States, social death did not 
finish with the end of slavery. Whereas Patterson’s text regards 
manumission as concluding slavery through the recovery of freedom, 
Afropessimists have questioned the effective impact of that moment, 
arguing that the notion of social death applies not only to enslaved people 
but can be extended to their descendants as well, even among current 
generations. Afropessimists coincide with Patterson on the idea that 
enslaved peoples outside the Americas might have been able to return 
to their native land after manumission, recovering social and 
geographical bonds blurred by years of forceful labor. Yet, in the long 
wake of the Middle Passage10, Afropessimists specify that, for those 
taken to America, the recovery of an “original” state of “freedom” was and 
has always been impossible. In America, the routes from freedom to 
slavery are either untraceable or simply impossible to navigate due to 
generational, linguistic and cultural deracination. As Frank B. Wilderson 
III points out, there can never be “a prior meta-moment of plentitude” for 
Black Americans, “never a moment of equilibrium, never a moment of 
social life” (Wilderson, 2016: n.p.). Which is to say, Wilderson concludes, 
that “Blackness is social death” (2016: n.p.; emphasis Wilderson’s). 
 
Afropessimism’s expansion of social death is founded upon the fallacy of 
manumission or, to put it in Wilderson’s terms, based on the “failure” of 
“redemption” (2016: n.p). “I, as Black person (if person, subject, being 
are terms we can use),” Wilderson states, “am both barred from the 
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denouement of redemption and, simultaneously, needed if redemption is 
to attain any form of coherence” (2016: n.p.). The problematic of 
redemption stems from the catch-22 of its narrative arc: from (a) freedom 
or equilibrium to (b) slavery or disequilibrium, back to (a) 
freedom/equilibrium/redemption. So how to re-gain something that has 
never been ours? How to go “back to” freedom? How to reach “plentitude” 
when there has never been a “meta-moment” of it? Wilderson clarifies: 
 
The narrative arc of the slave who is Black (unlike Orlando Patterson’s generic 
slave who may be of any race) is not an arc at all, but […] a flat line that 
“moves” from disequilibrium to a moment in the narrative of faux equilibrium, 
to disequilibrium restored and/or rearticulated. To put it differently, the 
violence which both elaborates and saturates Black “life” is totalizing, so much 
so as to make narrative inaccessible to Blacks11. (2016: n.p.; emphasis 
Wilderson’s) 
 
Significantly, Wilderson’s bold claims are not a mere corroboration of 
social death. If Patterson blurs the line separating life and death, 
Afropessimists go a step further. In Wilderson’s revision of Hegelian 
dialectics, “the dust up is not between the workers and the bosses, not 
between settler and the native, not between the queer and the straight, 
but between the living and the dead” (2016: n.p.). Calling into question 
the “social” in Patterson’s consideration of the slave as a “social 
nonperson,” Wilderson sees the dishonor and natal alienation that further 
constitute the status of the enslaved as characteristic of “abjection rather 
than […] degradation” (2016: n.p.)12. Afropessimists thus problematize 
not only the “livability” of the racialized, to use Judith Butler’s (2004) term, 
but also their very ontological status. Wilderson’s aforementioned doubt 
that “person, subject” and even “being” might be categories applicable to 
Black people does confirm the failure of redemption—of Patterson’s 
manumission—but it also implies the broader impossibility of a Black 
metaphysics. It is from this position of distrust that Wilderson disputes 
Patterson, arguing that “there is no place like Europe to which Slaves can 
return as Human beings” (2016: n.p.; emphasis mine). 
 
“[W]hat is the nature of a human being”, asks Jared Sexton, “whose 
human being is put into question radically and by definition, a human 
being whose being human raises the question of being human at all?” 
(Sexton, 2011: 6). “[C]an blacks have life?”, condenses Warren, “can 
black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human?” (Warren, 2020: 1-
2). For Wilderson, answering these questions demands a confrontation 
of the “foundational belief” in the Humanities that “all sentient beings can 
be emplotted as narrative entities, that every sentient subject is imbued 
with historicity” (Wilderson, 2016: n.p.)13. Against this widespread 
assumption, he challenges “the idea that all beings can be redeemed” 
and accuses “historicity and redemption” of being “inherently anti-Black 
in that without the psychic and/or physical presence of a sentient being 
that is barred, ab initio, from narrative and, by extension, barred from 
redemption, the arc of redemption would lack any touchstones of 
cohesion” (2016: n.p.)14. If Black people are deprived of access to 
narrative as a metaphysical form, their ontological essence is also 
jeopardized. For Wilderson, there is little room for hesitation—Blackness 
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is marked by a “meta-aporia of narrative” which significantly portends an 
“absence of humanity” (2016: n.p.). 
 
The contemporary persistence of social death is proven by the fact that 
to this day Black and Brown people continue to be treated as nonbeings 
by institutional powers. Perhaps its most jarring instance is, as a recent 
analysis of data collected between 2013 and 2018 states, that in the 
United States “young men of color face exceptionally high risk of being 
killed by police”, the highest lifetime risk being that of Black men, “about 
2.5 times more likely to be killed by police over the life course than white 
men” (Edwards et al., 2020: 16794). The murders of Tamir Rice, Sandra 
Bland, or George Floyd are the mere tip of an enormous, transhistorical 
iceberg, only visible thanks to the relentless effort of those who have 
persistently refused to forget15. Their names testify to the political 
vulnerability of racialized Americans, just as the work of Danez Smith, 
Claudia Rankine, or Patricia Smith corroborates the phenomenology of 
social death through poetry. It is undoubtedly outrageous, but not for that 
reason less true, that to this day many continue to embody the nonhuman 
status of the enslaved. 
 
In Danez Smith’s poetry, the meta-aporia of Black metaphysics is 
ubiquitous. As early as in “black boy be,” the first poem in Smith’s opera 
prima, [insert] boy, the life of Black youths is said to be “like a nothing at 
all” (2014: 15). Further on, the speaker in “for black boys” wonders “how 
do you describe a son set / course to casket from birth?” to then conclude, 
“you have always been a dying thing” (2014: 19-20). The poet’s 
awareness of social death continues to be expressed throughout the 
book and spills into Smith’s following volumes. In “summer, somewhere,” 
the contradiction of such life-in-death is stated plainly: “dead is the safest 
i’ve ever been. / i’ve never been so alive.” (2017: 16). Even more 
specifically meaningful to our reading here, HIV is presented in most of 
Smith’s poems as inseparable from the speaker’s position as Black and 
queer. Conscious of the disproportionate ratio of queer, Black Americans 
living with HIV in the present and dead from AIDS in previous decades, 
the I in “every day is a funeral & a miracle” ponders 
 
do i think someone created AIDS? 
maybe. i don’t doubt that  
anything is possible in a place 
where you can burn a body 
with less outrage than a flag (2017: 65) 
 
Smith’s accusation is not new—in fact, it expands on Hemphill’s blunt 
“who wants us dead, / what purpose does it serve?” asked from the 
deadly first years of the pandemic in “When My Brother Fell” (Hemphill, 
1992: 33)—, but current data continue to make room for asking such 
questions. As the succinctly titled “1 in 2” states in its first lines, “On 
February 23rd, 2016, the CDC released a study estimating 1 in 2 black 
men / who have sex with men will be diagnosed with HIV in their lifetime” 
(Smith, 2017: 61). HIV is thus continuously associated to the (social) 
death of Black people in Smith’s lyric work. It is this recurring connection 
that makes “sometimes i wish i felt the side effects” stand out so vividly. 
The speaker in the poem self-depicts as dead, as a being whose very 
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being is called into question. However, death is here not a result of 
exposure to disease, but the effect of systemic anti-Blackness.  
 
The commented final line in the poem, where the speaker’s blood is a 
“dead river” attests to such a conception of the Black body. Similarly, the 
speaker’s effort to give themself an opportunity (“gave my body a shot”) 
implies the hardship and the continuous obstacles posed on Black 
bodies’ literal struggle for survival. The body is here given an opportunity 
despite itself, so that remaining alive is a conscious decision, expressed 
in contrast with its supposedly natural relegation to social death. The fact 
that HIV is metaphorically expressed as childbearing in the poem also 
confirms this reading. The virus becomes “pregnant proof / that in you, 
life swells” (Smith, 2020a: 33) because viruses can only survive when 
hosted by a living being. HIV cannot be unless it is sustained by a body. 
In a way, the lyric I conceives the virus as much as the virus conceives 
the I. That is, the I can conceive (of) themself not in spite of but thanks to 
the virus.  
 
HIV appears in “sometimes i wish i felt the side effects” as salmon shining 
in glorious grace because it is given a space to thrive in. It is not just that 
sickness and death are not likened in the poem but, rather, that sickness 
challenges death. If the speaker shows such insistent appreciation for 
HIV, it is because the virus paradoxically threatens but also recovers the 
I’s lost metaphysics. In this sense, HIV appears as a both intrusive and 
saving presence. The rest of the epithets to the virus in the poem—“my 
toxic angel, wasted utopia” (2020a: 33)—further illustrate HIV’s powerful 
ambivalence: both protective and deadly, both intangible and real, a 
double-edgedness which can be extended to the whole notion of social 
death. The speaker’s existence is proven by HIV and vice versa. The 
virus is, indeed, the speaker’s “proof of life”. 
 
 
3. Hope, or the Beneficent Crisis of the Present 
 
I have heretofore probed the possibilities and limitations of combining two 
schools of thought with such mutually-excluding names as Queer 
Optimism and Afropessimism. The centrality of hope in the opposition 
between optimism and pessimism—its presence in the former, lack in the 
latter—should indeed suggest their incompatibility. As I am about to 
argue, however, there is hope in Afropessimism, and my reading of 
Smith’s poem shows, in fact, that these analytical approaches actually 
coincide and reinforce each other. 
 
Afropessimism needs to be understood not as an attack on Black 
subjectivity or agency, but rather on those forms of power which deprive 
Black people of such qualities. It is not that Blacks “deserve” to be seen 
as essentially non-human per se but that Black existence problematizes 
the notion of human as it is generally conceived. Afropessimism 
highlights the faults in the ideological structures sustaining our 
understanding of what is categorized as human. It is a critical inquiry into 
those forms of power which systematically oppress entire sections of our 
population. As Sexton affirms, 
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nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that 
black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil 
society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of 
history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with 
the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world 
system. (2011: 28) 
 
In short, Sexton claims, “blackness is not the pathogen in afro-
pessimism, the world is” (Sexton, 2011: 28). The task of Afropessimism 
is thus to acknowledge both the harrowing meta-aporia of Black 
metaphysics and, at the same time, to highlight the external cause of 
such ontological deprivation. Afropessimism does not deny Black power. 
Instead, it points to those structures which restrict it. Were these 
structures to fall, Blackness would not equal social death, nor negative 
metaphysics, nor life-in-death. Removed from its current context of 
systemic racism, police brutality, institutionalized anti-Blackness, and 
white supremacy, Blackness would be—in fact, can be—nothing other 
than life.  
 
At first, the label accusatorily attributed to Afropessimism can be 
misleading. Wilderson’s “meta-aporia of narrative” and his resulting 
conclusion that redemption and historicity more generally are fallacies for 
Black people may certainly look like a hopeless denial of futurity. 
Associating hope exclusively to the future, however, would render 
Afropessimists’ critique altogether ineffectual. As Snediker points out in 
his introduction, “that hope definitionally exists futurally, […] is the sort of 
temporal donnée against which Queer Optimism speaks” (2009: 16). And 
that is where Queer Optimism and Afropessimism meet—in their shared 
refusal to equate hope and future. For hope is not a passive, unengaged 
longing for the future. Instead, as Sara Ahmed notes, 
 
hope involves a relationship to the present, and to the present as affected by 
its imperfect translation of the past. It is in the present that the bodies of 
subjects shudder with an expectation of what is otherwise; it is in the unfolding 
of the past in the present. The moment of hope is when the ‘not yet’ impresses 
upon us in the present, such that we must act, politically, to make it our future. 
(Ahmed, 2004: 184) 
 
Afropessimism is only pessimistic when it remains stuck in the distancing 
futurity of the possibility of social life. But, rather than denying the 
possibility of change, afropessimism must be read as pointing toward the 
only perspective from which change can be achieved—the present. By 
accentuating the current impossibility of a utopian, better future, 
Wilderson’s narrative dilemma forces our gaze back to the present where 
injustice is taking place, thus making room for the “not yet” from which 
political action must stem. This exact temporal shift is perfectly illustrated 
in Smith’s poem when the speaker reflects “i only knew how to live / when 
i knew how i’ll die. // i want to live” (34). In these lines, life is projected 
backward into the past: “knew how to live”; while the future is curtailed by 
the certainty of death: “knew how i’ll die”; but tension resolves in a third 
line claiming the present: “i want to live”. Temporality is initially explored 
both backward and forward, but in the end this dichotomy is solved by 
the speaker’s will.  
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In Extravagant Abjection, Darieck B. Scott argues that “neither the 
absolute past as defeat nor the absolute future as liberation and victory 
are the areas of anything other than directional emphasis—it is instead 
the fact that there can be movement toward one or another that is truly 
to be grasped” (2010: 51). It is that directional emphasis that Smith’s 
temporal readjustment showcases. That is the possibility of movement 
toward change that Afropessimism demands. Its apparent negation of the 
future is not so much a truncating denial of the possibility of change as 
an affirmation of and a call to an absolute presentness which we must 
seize if any livable future is to ever exist. In other words, by focusing on 
the impossibility of future recovery and underscoring the external sources 
of social death, afropessimist thought indicates a need to act in what 
Snediker calls “the beneficent crisis of the present, in which all such 
experiments must occur” (2009: 218). 
 
Despite their ostensible irreconcilability, Queer Optimism and 
Afropessimism work toward the common goal of engaging in the 
destabilization of the rigid meliorism of future-oriented temporalities to 
indicate the distinctive potential of the present. Not so much ignoring the 
effects of the past on the present but actually inspired by the former’s 
ability to condition the latter, both critical trends urge us to immerse 
ourselves in the performative promise of what Scott calls the “future 
anterior”: the present’s capacity to condition the future. Believing in the 
possibilities of the future anterior, understanding that Afropessimism’s 
bold questioning of Black metaphysics is nothing but the necessary 
creation of a critical awareness laying the foundations of change, we can 
only agree with Sexton when he claims that “afro-pessimism is ‘not but 
nothing other than’ black optimism” (2011: 37). 
 
As “sometimes i wish i felt the side effects” optimistically illustrates, Black 
metaphysics can be reified not in spite of but thanks to HIV. After the 
challenging experience of coming to terms with a positive HIV diagnosis 
in Don’t Call Us Dead, HIV is revisited and reconsidered in Homie from a 
new, more developed viewpoint. Throughout this volume, the virus 
continues at times to trigger images of mortality: “my blood brings me 
closer to death” (2020: 59); and antiretroviral treatment is embraced as 
“my miracle” (53). Death is not unfamiliar for the I, Smith insists, as being 
HIV+ implies being not “close” but “closer” to death, a comparative which 
proves the point of Afropessimism by showing death as already adjacent. 
Moreover, medical treatment is a “miracle” in its power to defy the 
perceived impossibility of survival. Yet, at the same time, such closeness 
to mortality as generated by contact with HIV accentuates the fact that, 
in spite of the undeniability of social death, the speaker is, for now, alive. 
It may be that the wish for side effects stated in the title of the poem I 
have been analyzing responds, simply, to a wish for a more constant 
reminder of such aliveness. Toward the end of the volume, after 
considering suicide as a shortcut to the “greater world” where “the rivers 
flow milk & honey / & hennessey & koolaid”, the lyric I in “my nig” chooses 
to remain alive: “none of that, just give me / the heaven of now” (68). As 
painful as life is, nothing is better than the “heaven” of the present. 
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Smith’s posthuman embrace of HIV challenges traditional (anti-Black) 
epistemologies while also redirecting Afropessimism’s attention to the 
politically charged present of the Black body’s narrative arc. The poet’s 
latest verse is invaluable in that it bears witness not only to racism and 
institutionalized violence against Black and Brown people in the United 
States, or to the persistent serophobia and stigma pervading our 
everyday lives, but also to the possibility to inhabit a hopeful present 
where the intricate intersection between racialization and HIV status can 
bear fruit. As I have argued elsewhere, in Don’t Call Us Dead the threat 
of HIV triggers a wide range of self-defensive imagery expressing a 
perceived need to define the limits of the body (Juncosa, 2021). 
Contrastingly, in Homie the experience of seropositivity is strongly 
connected to hope, and “hope”, Ahmed reminds us, “may expand the 
contours of bodies, as they reach towards what is possible” (2004: 185). 
The experience of the virus thus forces the speaker from the constriction 
of an uncertain future to the material truth of now. HIV’s continuous 
reminder of mortality corroborates the meta-aporia of Black metaphysics, 
but this awareness situates the speaker in an almost absolute present 
where change can be sparked. Attesting to the importance of 
intersectionality for political strife, Smith’s poetry shows that there is 
beauty to be found, but that beauty does not prevent nor hide inequality, 
and that our work against the tangible reality of social death must stem 
from the promise of the present. For a present in which life needs no 






* The project that gave rise to these results received the support of a fellowship from “la 
Caixa” Foundation (ID 100010434). The fellowship code is “LCF/BQ/DR19/11740031”. 
2 This paper respects Smith’s preference for the gender-neutral pronoun “they”. 
3 See Melton, 2016. 
4 See “Dear Essex” (Smith, 2019), “gay cancer” (Smith, 2020a: 60), and “my deepest 
and most ashamed apologies to Assotto Saint” (Smith, 2020b). 
5 See Hemphill’s Ceremonies (1992) and Saint’s “Hooked for Life” (1991).  
6 For an analysis of HIV as loss of freedom and imprisonment in Smith’s Don’t Call Us 
Dead, see Juncosa, 2019. 
7 For an analysis of HIV as generating a need for protection and fortification imagery, 
see Juncosa, 2021. 
8 See, for instance, Crimp, 1989; Cvetkovich, 2003; Ramazani, 1994; Pearl, 2013; or 
Zeiger, 1997. 
9 For a more detailed analysis of HIV as a potential source of kinship in Smith’s work in 
dialogue with Tim Dean’s “blood brotherhood” (Dean, 2008), see Juncosa, 2021. 
10 For an exhaustive consideration of the long-lasting impact of the Middle Passage and 
of slavery in US society, as well as an in-depth exploration of the term “wake”, see 
Sharpe 2018. 
11 Douglass & Wilderson (2016) use the same logical pattern in their comparison of 
Black American social death to Elaine Scarry’s account of torture. For Scarry, torture 
deprives the torture victim of all subjectivity, but such subjectivity can ideally be 
recovered in the process of healing—again, from equilibrium to disequilibrium, back to 
equilibrium. As Douglass & Wilderson state, this narrative arc does not apply to Blacks 
insofar as “the black arrives at the torture chamber in a psychic state too deracinated to 
be credited to a prior torture” (2016: 121). It is not that the authors equate Blackness to 
torture. Rather, they question the universal availability of equilibrium on which the idea 
of recovery is grounded. 
12 The notion of abjection, like that of pathology, offers abundant food for thought in its 
constructed relation to Blackness, queerness, and HIV. On queer Blackness as 
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abjection, see Craig, 2017; Reid-Pharr, 2001; and Scott, 2010. On Blackness as 
pathology, see Moten, 2008; Sexton, 2011; and Sharpe, 2012. 
13 For more on Blackness as sentient being, see Judy, 2020. 
14 Wilderson’s statement that redemption is “inherently anti-Black” is as daring as it is 
radical. We must consider that the “narrative arc” which he deems inaccessible for Black 
people is central to the Pauline account of crucifixion around which African American 
Fundamentalist Protestantism revolves. While also an important reference for 
communal ontological structuration for many branches of Judeo-Christianity, the notion 
of redemption is deeply rooted in the Black American imaginary as a source of hope in 
future progress. Wilderson’s rejection of it is particularly poignant and has enormous 
implications for Black politics. See Patterson, 1982: 66-76. 
15 For a detailed account of the impact of journalistic insistence on not allowing these 
cases to go into oblivion, see Rambsy, 2020. 
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